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1.  Abstract 
Intrusion detection is an area of increasing attention and its deployment has accelerated rapidly 
in enterprises and mission-critical systems over the last few years. Commercial vendors and the 
open source community have responded with a plethora of intrusion detection products. Now a 
new issue has surfaced - there is no standard way for these closed and incompatible systems to 
communicate. Lack of standards hampers research and deployment of intrusion detection 
technology. First “Common Intrusion Detection Framework” (CIDF) and then simpler to use 
“Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format” (IDMEF) have been proposed as the standards 
to be used by such systems to interoperate and exchange messages. This paper presents the 
motivation for such standardization efforts and an overview of a potential standard – IDMEF 
along with its communication protocol IDXP. 
2.  Introduction to IDS and Its Diversity 
IDS stands for Intrusion Detection System, which is available as a software and hardware 
appliance for detecting inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activities including network 
attacks by hackers over the Internet and within the organization. IDSs that operate on a host, i.e., 
computers running Windows, Solaris, Linux, etc., to detect malicious activity on that host are 
called host-based IDSs, and IDSs that operate by sniffing network packets are called network-
based IDSs. IDSs are also available for monitoring applications, proxies, etc. 
The second split in IDS design is the approach to specify and detect intrusions. The most 
common approaches to intrusion detection are signature based detection and statistical anomaly 
detection. Signature matching IDSs are based on recognizing patterns of known exploits. They 
have low false-alarm rates, but are limited to recognizing configured exploits only, and often 
report after a system has been compromised. On the other hand, anomaly-detecting IDSs can 
detect novel exploits and provide an early warning when an attack is underway, both at the cost 
of high false-alarm rates, often so high that users are overwhelmed by alerts and start 
disregarding the IDS. 
3.  Emergence of Meta-IDS & Enterprise Security Managers 
Enterprises typically have at least one IDS on each network and critical host. They must have 
multiple IDSs at their disposal because the various IDSs all have different strengths and 
weaknesses based on the characteristics mentioned above, such as, host and network-based. With 
the current state of the technology and a huge spectrum of potential intrusions, it appears that no 
single IDS vendor can address the security needs of a typical enterprise.  
Due to lack of an industry standard for reporting intrusion incidents, it has become a middleware 
nightmare to manage the outputs from IDSs of multiple vendors. Monitoring and analyzing alerts 
from even a handful of IDSs can quickly overwhelm a security staff.  © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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One answer is “Meta-IDS,” [16] or enterprise-level security management console, capable of 
keeping up with the reams of alert data flowing from security devices including host and network 
IDSs. The primary role of a Meta-IDS is to ‘aggregate’ - accept security alerts from all deployed 
IDSs, massage the raw data, extract useful information and present that information in a unified 
format. It can also ‘cross-correlate’ alerts coming from multiple IDSs, to provide a complete 
analysis of what attacks are happening across the enterprise network. It’s possible for such a 
centralized system to eliminate some of the false alarms based on the global knowledge of the 
enterprise network and hosts. Finally, Meta-IDS can notify a security staff about potential 
intrusions and provide forensic reporting on the aggregated data. 
Adding security devices other than IDSs to the mix, such as, firewall logs, router logs, OS event 
logs, application security logs, anti-virus logs, etc., and you have just turned a Meta-IDS into a 
Console for enterprise wide security monitoring. Aggregating all security logs at one centralized 
location enables enterprises to apply effective correlation techniques in real-time and forensic 
modes. The more information you can bring to a centralized place, the more effective the 
correlation becomes in order to detect intrusions that would go undetected otherwise and to 
reduce false-alarm rates. 
IDS vendors (Cisco, ISS, etc.) are making it easier to correlate data from their own sensors, but 
their products are long way from taking data from firewall, routers, or applications that might 
have information about the attacks. Enterprises wishing to correlate data cross-device and/or 
cross-vendor must turn to enterprise security management products such as ArcSight, eSecurity, 
netForensics and others, or build the solution in-house. For now, these Meta-IDS and enterprise 
security management products come with their own array of ‘agents,’ each of which interprets 
alerts coming from a specific security device. 
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In order to aggregate and correlate, the Meta-IDS or Enterprise Security Manager must be able to 
receive and interpret alerts from all deployed security devices - even those from different 
vendors, none of which may use the same format or vocabulary for reporting possible attacks. 
While no uniform guidelines exist today, there are communities working on standards that will 
let IDSs speak to each other, as well as to security consoles.  
This means Meta-IDS consoles will soon accept input from any IDS or security device that 
conforms to the standards. In other words, customers will no longer be restricted to correlation © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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consoles from their IDS vendors or restricted to a set of IDS supported by deployed Meta-IDS. 
They can acquire best-of-breed IDS for their environment while retaining their preferred 
Enterprise Security Manager for correlation. 
4.  Intrusion Detection Standardization Efforts 
Among the most extensive of the proposals for interoperability towards a standard intrusion 
detection protocol are the Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF) and the Intrusion 
Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF).  
A. CIDF 
CIDF [11] was an attempt by the US government's Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA) to develop an IDS interchange language in response to their concerns that 
no single IDS vendor can address the entire spectrum of attacks. CIDF was a research project 
and not intended as a standard that would influence the commercial marketplace. 
CIDF contains a high-level model consisting of event generators, analyzers, databases, and 
responders. CIDF specifies a Lisp-like language - Common Intrusion Specification Language 
(CISL) that is used to communicate between the components. The CISL syntax employs 
nested S-expressions with a fairly rich vocabulary to form messages describing attacks. The 
language includes nouns describing the subjects and objects, and verbs, such as “delete” and 
“open session”. While quite powerful, some IDS authors have found CISL to be cumbersome, 
and to date its practical applications have been limited. It has, however, been influential in 
shaping other efforts in research. CIDF development took place during 1997-99 and some of 
the ideas that came out of it have been rolled into IDMEF, which is a separate work. 
B. IDMEF 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is the body, which develops new Internet 
standards. They have a working group, the Intrusion Detection Exchange Format Working 
Group (IDWG)[1], to develop a common format for IDS alerts. Its charter is “to define data 
formats and exchange procedures for sharing information of interest to intrusion detection and 
response systems, and to management systems which may need to interact with them.”  
The working group has proposed IDMEF - an XML based specification for intrusion alert 
format for these systems to communicate. A lot of attention has been paid to the needs of IDS 
analysis, and to making the protocol work through firewalls in a straightforward way.  
IDMEF message format is independent of the communication protocol. IDWG has also 
proposed IDXP as the communication protocol for IDMEF, but it’s not a necessary 
requirement for IDMEF applications.  
IDWG, IDMEF, IDP, IAP, and IDXP, all related and slightly confusing terms, ironically 
came from the same standardization effort. Here is a quick review to make the rest of the 
paper clearer. IDWG is the name of the working group, and the more popular term IDMEF is 
the message format, which is independent of the communication protocol. IDP is the 
specification (not implementation) for the IDMEF communication protocol described in the 
same IDMEF requirement specification [3]. There are two implementations of IDP – the early 
one is called IAP (Intrusion Alert Protocol[6]), which did not make it to the RFC. The newer © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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and recommended one is IDXP – Intrusion Detection eXchange Protocol[5] – described 
below in section 9. 
5.  IDMEF Motivation 
Besides the Meta-IDS need described above, the IDMEF requirement specification [3] describes 
the following additional reasons for such a standard:  
Intrusions frequently involve multiple organizations as victims, or multiple sites within the same 
organization. Typically, those sites will use different IDSs. It would be very helpful to correlate 
such distributed intrusions across multiple sites and administrative domains. Having reports from 
all sites in a common format would facilitate this task.  
The existence of a common format should allow components from different IDSs to be 
integrated more readily. Thus, intrusion detection research should migrate into commercial 
products more easily.  
Let’s take a scenario of DShield.org [20], which is an attempt to collect data about suspicious 
activity from all over the Internet. This data is cataloged and summarized to discover simple 
trends in activities. They require members to submit logs in all sorts of formats by installing 
specialized ‘clients’ from a huge array of supported devices. Then they need to re-map different 
log formats to their central database by losing some of the information. If there were standards 
for security logs, such as IDMEF, it would have been much easier for members to send logs and 
also, DShield.org could have efficiently inserted the log into their database and retarget their 
efforts from writing clients to working on finding complex patterns utilizing complete 
information. 
All of these reasons suggest that a common format for reporting alerts should help the IDS 
market to grow and innovate more effectively, and should also result in users obtaining better 
results from deployment of intrusion detection systems. 
6.  IDMEF Terminology 
The activities of the IDWG are integrated closely with Intrusion Detection Systems, so 
descriptions of the IDMEF use typical IDS terminology.  Some of the terms used in IDMEF are 
described below:  © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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The diagram above illustrates the terms described below and their relationships. Not every IDS 
will have all of these separate components exactly as shown. Some IDSs will combine these 
components into a single module; some will have multiple instances of these modules. 
Activities: Activities are elements of the data source that are identified by the sensor or analyzer 
as being of interest to the operator. Examples of this include network session showing 
unexpected telnet activity, operating system log file entries showing a user attempting to access 
files to which he or she is not authorized to have access, etc. 
Event: Activity that is detected by the sensor and which may result in an IDMEF alert being 
transmitted.  For example, 'N' failed logins in 'T' seconds might indicate a brute-force login 
attack.  
Alert: A message from an analyzer to a manager that an event of interest has been detected.  An 
alert typically contains information about the unusual activity that was detected, as well as the 
specifics of the occurrence. 
Administrator: The human with overall responsibility for setting the security policy of the 
organization including decisions about deploying and configuring the IDSs. 
Operator: The human that is primary user of the IDS manager for initiating responses to alerts 
and notifications.  
Sensor: The ID component that collects data about activity from data sources, detects events, 
and forwards them to the analyzer. 
Analyzer: The ID component that analyses the events and according to the security policy 
possibly generates alerts based on these events. Alerts are formatted and transferred to managers 
using the IDMEF format over IDXP (optional) transfer protocol. In many existing IDSs, the 
sensor and the analyzer are part of the same component. 
Manager: The ID component or process from which the operator manages the various 
components of the ID system.  Management functions typically include (but are not limited to) © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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sensor configuration, analyzer configuration, event notification management, data consolidation, 
and reporting. Managers inform the operator through different types of notification that alerts 
have occurred, as per the security policy. 
7.  IDMEF Data Model 
The top-level class for all IDMEF messages is IDMEF-Message; each type of message is a 
subclass of this top-level class.  There are presently two types of messages defined: Alerts and 
Heartbeats. Within each message, subclasses of the message class are used to provide the 
detailed information carried in the message. 
The relationship between the principal components of the data model is shown in the following 
figure (occurrence indicators and attributes are omitted). 
IDMEF-Message
Alert Heartbeat
AnalyzerTime
Analyzer
CreateTime
DetectTime
AdditionalData
Assessment
Classification
Target
Service
Node
User
Process
FileList
Analyzer
CreateTime
AdditionalData
Source
Service
Node
User
Process
IDMEF-Message
Alert Heartbeat
AnalyzerTime
Analyzer
CreateTime
DetectTime
AdditionalData
Assessment
Classification
Target
Service
Node
User
Process
FileList
Analyzer
CreateTime
AdditionalData
Source
Service
Node
User
Process
 
It is important to note that the data model does not specify how an alert should be classified or 
identified.  For example, a port-scan might be identified by one analyzer as a single attack 
against multiple targets while another analyzer might identify it as multiple attacks from a single 
source. However, once an analyzer has determined the type of alert it plans to send, the data 
model dictates how that alert should be formatted. 
8.  IDMEF Message Content 
There are many different types of IDSs, such as those based on: signatures, anomalies, 
correlation, network monitoring, host monitoring, or application monitoring.  IDMEF strives to © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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accommodate these diverse approaches by concentrating on conveying ‘what’ an IDS has 
detected, rather than ‘how’ it detected it. 
The content of IDMEF messages contains the identified name of the event (Classification) if it is 
known.  This name is drawn from a standardized list (bugtraq, cve, etc.) of events (if available) 
or will be an implementation-specific name if the event identity has not yet been standardized.  
Consider a scenario where an attack is detected by two different analyzers from two distinct 
implementations. Both report the same event identity to the manager, even though the algorithms 
used to detect the attack by each analyzer might have been different.  
The IDMEF message contains an indication of the possible impact of this event on the target. It 
also allows references to additional detailed data related to this specific underlying event.  
The IDMEF message contains the identity of the source of the event and target component 
identifier if it is known.  In the case of a network-based event, this will be the source and 
destination IP address of the session used to launch the event.  It supports the representation of 
different types of device addresses, such as, IP address, MAC address, addresses used in ATM 
switch fabric, etc.  
The following classes are some of the core classes in the IDMEF message as described in 
IDMEF Data Model [4]: 
The IDMEF-Message Class: All IDMEF messages are instances of the IDMEF-Message class; 
it is the top-level class of the IDMEF data model, as well as the IDMEF DTD.  There are 
currently two types of IDMEF-Message: Alert and Heartbeat. 
The Alert Class: Generally, every time an analyzer detects an event that it has been configured 
to look for, it sends an Alert message to its manager(s). Depending on the analyzer, an Alert 
message may correspond to a single detected event, or multiple detected events.  Alerts occur 
asynchronously in response to outside events. The Alert class has one optional attribute ident - a 
unique identifier for the alert. Alert is represented in the XML DTD as follows: 
      <!ELEMENT Alert                         ( 
          Analyzer, CreateTime, DetectTime?, AnalyzerTime?, Source*, 
          Target*, Classification+, Assessment?, (ToolAlert | 
          OverflowAlert | CorrelationAlert)?, AdditionalData* 
        )> 
      <!ATTLIST Alert 
          ident               CDATA                   '0' 
        > 
Classification: One or more.  The "name" of the alert, or other information allowing the manager 
to determine what it is. 
The Analyzer Class: The Analyzer class identifies the analyzer from which the alert or heartbeat 
message originates.  Only one analyzer may be encoded for each alert or heartbeat, and that 
MUST be the analyzer at which the alert or heartbeat originated. 
The AdditionalData Class:  Zero or more.  Information included by the analyzer that does not 
fit into the data model.  This may be an atomic piece of data, or a large amount of data provided 
through an extension to the IDMEF. © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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The Heartbeat Class: Analyzers use Heartbeat messages to indicate their current status to   
managers.  Heartbeats are intended to be sent in a regular period, say every ten minutes or every 
hour.  The receipt of a Heartbeat message from an analyzer indicates to the manager that the 
analyzer is up and running; lack of a Heartbeat message (or more likely, lack of some number of 
consecutive Heartbeat messages) indicates that the analyzer or its network connection has failed. 
The CreateTime Class:  The CreateTime class is used to indicate the date and time the alert or 
heartbeat was created by the analyzer. 
9.  IDMEF Communication Protocol - IDXP 
Analyzers create and communicate alerts to managers across a TCP/IP network. This 
communication must be done in a standard and secure fashion and is referred as the IDMEF 
Communication Protocol (IDP) in the requirement specifications [3]. Note that IDP is a 
specification and not an implementation. 
The IDP specification requires reliable transmission of messages between ID components across 
firewall boundaries without compromising security. The implementation must also support 
mutual authentication of the analyzer and the manager to each other. The support is also required 
for confidentiality of the message content with a variety of encryption algorithms as well as 
integrity and resistance for DoS attacks. 
The working group’s first attempt to meet IDP requirements was the development of the 
Intrusion Alert Protocol (IAP)[6]. The design of IAP was based on HTTP, which turned out to be 
unsuitable for several reasons.  
Then the working group decided to use the Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP)[9], 
which itself is a new IETF general framework for application protocols. BEEP does not rely on 
any particular transport protocol. It specifies requirements on how an underlying transport 
protocol must support a BEEP session. It maps easily to any connection oriented transport 
protocol offering ordered and reliable delivery including TCP/IP. 
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BEEP framework is used as the basis to derive an Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol 
(IDXP). It allows authentication and confidentiality through the use of ‘profiles.’ So a profile is © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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created to specify IDXP requirements in the BEEP framework. A ‘Tunnel’ profile is also created 
for exchanging messages through firewalls.  
10. IDMEF Examples 
The following examples demonstrate how the IDMEF is used to encode alert data. 
a.  The "teardrop" Attack 
Network-based detection of the "teardrop" attack  
   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
   <!DOCTYPE IDMEF-Message PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD RFC XXXX IDMEF v1.0//EN" "idmef-message.dtd"> 
   <IDMEF-Message version="1.0"> 
     <Alert ident="abc123456789"> 
       <Analyzer analyzerid="hq-dmz-analyzer01"> 
         <Node category="dns"> 
           <location>Headquarters DMZ Network</location> 
           <name>analyzer01.bigcompany.com</name> 
         </Node> 
       </Analyzer> 
       <CreateTime ntpstamp="0xbc723b45.0xef449129"> 
         2000-03-09T10:01:25.93464-05:00 
       </CreateTime> 
       <Source ident="a1b2c3d4"> 
         <Node ident="a1b2c3d4-001" category="dns"> 
           <name>badguy.hacker.net</name> 
           <Address ident="a1b2c3d4-002" category="ipv4-net-mask"> 
             <address>123.234.231.121</address> 
             <netmask>255.255.255.255</netmask> 
           </Address> 
         </Node> 
       </Source> 
       <Target ident="d1c2b3a4"> 
         <Node ident="d1c2b3a4-001" category="dns"> 
           <Address category="ipv4-addr-hex"> 
             <address>0xde796f70</address> 
           </Address> 
         </Node> 
       </Target> 
       <Classification origin="bugtraqid"> 
         <name>124</name> 
         <url>http://www.securityfocus.com</url> 
       </Classification> 
     </Alert> 
   </IDMEF-Message> 
b.  Simple Port Scanning 
Network-based detection of a port-scan. This shows detection by a single analyzer; see the next 
example for the same attack as detected by a correlation engine.  Note the use of <portlist> to 
show the ports that were scanned. 
 
   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
   <!DOCTYPE IDMEF-Message PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD RFC XXXX IDMEF v1.0//EN" 
     "idmef-message.dtd"> 
   <IDMEF-Message version="1.0"> 
     <Alert ident="abc123456789"> 
       <Analyzer analyzerid="hq-dmz-analyzer62"> 
         <Node category="dns"> 
           <location>Headquarters Web Server</location> 
           <name>analyzer62.bigcompany.com</name> 
         </Node> 
       </Analyzer> 
       <CreateTime ntpstamp="0xbc72b2b4.0x00000000"> 
         2000-03-09T15:31:00-08:00 © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key fingerprint = AF19 FA27 2F94 998D FDB5 DE3D F8B5 06E4 A169 4E46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key fingerprint = AF19 FA27 2F94 998D FDB5 DE3D F8B5 06E4 A169 4E46 
 
© SANS Institute 2002, As part of the Information Security Reading Room. Author retains full rights.
       </CreateTime> 
       <Source ident="abc01"> 
         <Node ident="abc01-01"> 
           <Address ident="abc01-02" category="ipv4-addr"> 
             <address>222.121.111.112</address> 
           </Address> 
         </Node> 
       </Source> 
       <Target ident="def01"> 
         <Node ident="def01-01" category="dns"> 
           <name>www.bigcompany.com</name> 
           <Address ident="def01-02" category="ipv4-addr"> 
             <address>123.234.231.121</address> 
           </Address> 
         </Node> 
         <Service ident="def01-03"> 
           <portlist>5-25,37,42,43,53,69-119,123-514</portlist> 
         </Service> 
       </Target> 
       <Classification origin="vendor-specific"> 
         <name>portscan</name> 
         <url>http://www.vendor.com/portscan</url> 
       </Classification> 
     </Alert> 
   </IDMEF-Message> 
c.  Correlated Alerts 
The following example shows how the port scan alert from previous example could be 
represented if it had been detected and sent from a correlation engine, instead of a single 
analyzer. 
 
   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
   <!DOCTYPE IDMEF-Message PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD RFC XXXX IDMEF v1.0//EN" 
     "idmef-message.dtd"> 
   <IDMEF-Message version="1.0"> 
     <Alert ident="abc123456789"> 
       <Analyzer analyzerid="bc-corr-01"> 
         <Node category="dns"> 
           <name>correlator01.bigcompany.com</name> 
         </Node> 
       </Analyzer> 
       <CreateTime ntpstamp="0xbc72423b.0x00000000"> 
         2000-03-09T15:31:07Z 
       </CreateTime> 
       <Source ident="a1"> 
         <Node ident="a1-1"> 
           <Address ident="a1-2" category="ipv4-addr"> 
             <address>222.121.111.112</address> 
           </Address> 
         </Node> 
       </Source> 
       <Target ident="a2"> 
         <Node ident="a2-1" category="dns"> 
           <name>www.bigcompany.com</name> 
           <Address ident="a2-2" category="ipv4-addr"> 
             <address>123.234.231.121</address> 
           </Address> 
         </Node> 
         <Service ident="a2-3"> 
           <portlist>5-25,37,42,43,53,69-119,123-514</portlist> 
         </Service> 
       </Target> 
       <Classification origin="vendor-specific"> 
         <name>portscan</name> 
         <url>http://www.vendor.com/portscan</url> 
       </Classification> 
       <CorrelationAlert> 
         <name>multiple ports in short time</name> © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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         <alertident>123456781</alertident> 
         <alertident>123456782</alertident> 
         <alertident>123456783</alertident> 
         <alertident>123456784</alertident> 
         <alertident>123456785</alertident> 
         <alertident>123456786</alertident> 
         <alertident analyzerid="a1b2c3d4">987654321</alertident> 
         <alertident analyzerid="a1b2c3d4">987654322</alertident> 
       </CorrelationAlert> 
     </Alert> 
   </IDMEF-Message> 
d.  Heartbeat 
This example shows a heartbeat message that provides "I'm alive and working" information to 
the manager.  Note the use of <AdditionalData> elements, with "meaning" attributes, to provide 
some additional information. 
 
   <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
   <!DOCTYPE IDMEF-Message PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD RFC XXXX IDMEF v1.0//EN" "idmef-message.dtd"> 
   <IDMEF-Message version="1.0"> 
     <Heartbeat ident="abc123456789"> 
       <Analyzer analyzerid="hq-dmz-analyzer01"> 
         <Node category="dns"> 
           <location>Headquarters DMZ Network</location> 
           <name>analyzer01.bigcompany.com</name> 
         </Node> 
       </Analyzer> 
       <CreateTime ntpstamp="0xbc722ebe.0x00000000"> 
         2000-03-09T14:07:58Z 
       </CreateTime> 
       <AdditionalData type="real" meaning="%memused"> 
         62.5 
       </AdditionalData> 
       <AdditionalData type="real" meaning="%diskused"> 
         87.1 
       </AdditionalData> 
     </Heartbeat> 
   </IDMEF-Message> 
11. Related Intrusion Detection Initiatives 
The Intrusion Detection area has been blessed with several standardization efforts with slow but 
steady progress. CVE and BugTraq are examples of such efforts. Some of these efforts, 
especially the IDMEF derived IODEF, are summarized below. 
A. IODEF - Incident Object Description and Exchange Format 
The purpose of the Incident Object Description and Exchange Format [10] defines a common 
data format and common exchange procedures for sharing information needed to handle an 
incident between different CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response Teams) and to 
exchange incident related data that allows both known and new types of incidents to be 
formatted and exchanged.  The IODEF is based on the work done by IDWG and the leverage 
is helping their efforts to move fast.  
The IODEF's message is called IncidentAlert, which embeds the IDMEF message to cover 
most of the details. IODEF’s terminology is a superset of IDMEF’s terminology as it includes 
new terms, such as, Attack, Attacker, Damage, Event, Evidence, Incident, Impact, Victim, 
Vulnerability, etc. The working group has prototype work done to integrate IODEF with 
Remedy API. © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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B. IDIP: Intrusion Detection and Isolation Protocol 
Funded by DARPA, the Intruder Detection and Isolation Protocol (IDIP) [21] is an 
infrastructure for integrating IDSs and automated response components being developed at 
UC Davis. IDIP provides cooperation among intrusion detection systems, firewalls, routers, 
network management components, and hosts so that intrusions that cross multiple network 
boundaries can be automatically traced and blocked as close to the source as possible. IDIP 
has been tested with a variety of IDSs, firewalls, and host-based responders. It provides a 
discovery coordinator API to allow components access to services including data 
management, situation display, access to network management and response policy 
management. IDIP uses CISL as the attack description language. The emphasis in IDIP is on 
data management and secure communications between diverse components. 
12. IDMEF Weaknesses 
XML makes it easier to develop and deploy, but it comes with a performance cost.  Parsing 
XML messages is still a relatively slow task today, which is acceptable enough for order-
processing and inter-business applications. Since alerts received from IDSs are usually low, 
XML should work fine for the purpose. However, firewalls, routers, and such network devices, 
producing logs hundreds and thousands time higher than IDS alerts, may find IDMEF slow to 
work with. XML dependency of IDMEF may become a stumbling block for extending IDMEF 
coverage to such network devices. 
Current classification attribute “origin” has limited choices: “unknown”, “bugtraqid”, “cve” and 
“vendor-specific”. Getting into classifications and content semantics are considered beyond the 
scope of IDWG, which is a good as well as bad decision. It’s good because it provides the 
needed focus for IDWG efforts, keeps it simple, and also it does not confront them against IDS 
vendors with conflicting and overlapping rules. However, it’s bad because it would cause a glut 
of classification schemes – every IDS vendor rolling their own “vendor-specific” list since their 
alerts are not always vulnerabilities found on CVE list. 
It appears that IDMEF Data model fits very well with Network IDSs, but it does not map as well 
with non-IDS devices, such as, firewalls, NT Event Log, syslog, etc. For that, IDWG has created 
a ‘catch-all’ – AdditionalData class, to hold analyzer supplied information that does not fit into 
the data model. For instance, Checkpoint OPSEC interface produces over a dozen fields that are 
missing in the data model that will end up in AdditionalData. Since AdditionalData information 
goes as hidden details rather than top-level objects, most applications may not be able to manage 
and operate on it properly. Correlation will become less effective when interesting pieces of 
information are hidden in AdditionalData with different tag-names from different devices. 
Lastly, IDXP is based on BEEP, which itself is a new standard, so IDXP implementation may 
take long to become feasible for commercial deployment. 
13. IDWG Status and Extensions 
IDWG has delivered the following 4 documents that existed as Internet Drafts for a while. They 
are finishing the “final-call” period in mid-February 2002, and then these documents will be 
forwarded to the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) for publication as RFCs. © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Requirements [3]  
IDMEF Data Model and XML DTD [4] 
The Intrusion Detection Exchange Protocol (IDXP) [5] 
The TUNNEL Profile[7] 
As intrusion detection systems evolve, the IDMEF data model and DTD will have to evolve 
along with them.  To allow new features to be added as they are developed, both the data model 
and the DTD can be extended. There are two mechanisms for extending the IDMEF data model, 
inheritance and aggregation. And for extending the XML DTD, the AdditionalData class allows 
implementers a ‘catch-all’ to include arbitrary data items in an Alert or Heartbeat message.  
IDWG’s work will be RFC soon, so IDWG will need to decide what to do next. It could be as 
simple as working on the next version of document set or join the IODEF efforts, standardize 
vulnerability alerts, etc.  The job is far from over though, as the real challenge is to get the 
industry acceptance and that may involve taking the work to the next level and showing a few 
successful deployments. 
14. Industry Acceptance 
IDWG has successfully attracted participation of several industry leaders, such as, Cisco, NAI, 
HP, Boeing, IBM, ISS, MITRE, MSFT, Nokia, etc.  
It still remains to be seen whether IDMEF and IDXP will receive acceptance from commercial 
IDS vendors. Standards always take longer than expected for wide acceptance and IDWG is no 
exception. Once IDWG drafts become official RFC documents, we expect to see implementation 
from some of the IDS vendors, especially the ones who were involved with IDWG. 
The evolving correlation technologies will rely on such standards. Meta-IDS and enterprise 
security management vendors should adopt IDMEF early. IBM’s Tivoli Risk Manager and 
ArcSight’s Enterprise Security Manager are early adopters of IDMEF with demonstrated 
implementations. Another enterprise console vendor to announce support for IDMEF is 
eSecurity. Growth in deployment of Enterprise Security solutions in enterprises should also drive 
up the demand for such standards and interoperability. 
There are several tools and libraries available to help build IDMEF and IDXP applications. Most 
of them are accessible from Silicon Defense’s IDWG Web page [2]. Silicon Defense, a security 
research and consulting company, is actively involved with IDWG.  It has also delivered a free 
open-source library and a plug-in to enable SNORT to output IDMEF XML alerts, which seems 
to be the most popular implementation available for IDMEF today. 
IDMEF is also being used in several research projects. See references [12], [13] and [14] for 
links to some of them. 
15. Conclusions 
Lack of open standards for exchanging intrusion alerts and lack of interoperability could 
potentially hamper the growth of IDS deployment and research. Although IDMEF and IDXP 
have not yet been blessed as standard, they are very close to becoming one and have already 
started to get traction with research community, open source, and derivative standardization © SANS Institute 2002, Author retains full rights.
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efforts. However, further work and success stories may be required to convince IDS vendors and 
wider intrusion detection community of its usefulness. 
What HTML and HTTP did for Internet growth, IDMEF and IDXP can make similar impact on 
research and deployment of intrusion detection technology.  These are the steps in the right 
direction and we must collaborate to take it further and to keep ahead of the hacker community. 
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